Tracking the Theological “Turn”

The Pneumatological Imagination and the Renewal of Metaphysics and Theology in the 21st Century

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One candidate for inclusion among the eternal questions is: “What hath Athens to do with Jerusalem (or Azusa St.)?” And one contemporary answer is: “plenty.”

Why? Put negatively, Wolfhart Pannenberg cautions us that the absence of a contemporary, working metaphysical account of “God” is one of the most pressing theological problems of the 21st century. He considers a renewed metaphysics essential for any future philosophy or theology (Pannenberg 1990:6). Jean-Luc Marion concurs, noting “the fate of God could not avoid joining in the fate of metaphysics, for better or worse” (Marion 1997:279) in modernity. Postmodernity will certainly be no different in this regard.

Put positively, postmodernity has softened the traditional mutual excommunica of theology and philosophy by revealing that practitioners of both specialties are “confessional theorists.” In this sense, philosophy and theology may be seen as two ways of having faith. “Seeing is starting to look something like believing” for philosophy, while for theology, “believing is starting to look a lot like seeing” (Caputo 2006:57). In short, in John Caputo’s words, philosophy and theology may be thought of as “different moments in a common passion, different voices in a common song” (Caputo 2006:69).

These considerations are not lost on pentecostal1 philosopher Jamie K. A. Smith, who has called for the development of a distinctly pentecostal philosophy fitted for the needs of postmodernity (Smith 2003a:236, 244).2 Smith argues that we would not only be within our “epistemic rights” to undertake such a project, but also that it is incumbent upon pentecostal scholarship to do so if it is to fulfill its vocation as a servant of the academy, the Christian community, and the Church at large (Smith 2003a:243, 247).3
Can such a task be accomplished? Caputo notes that in speaking of “philosophy and theology” the most important word is the “and” (Caputo 2006:3). But what kind of “and” can suffice, given that modern philosophy pronounced the death of both metaphysics and God?

This paper proposes to address this question. The story I wish to tell of the “theological turn” in Continental philosophy is a provocative one. There is a sense of emergent truth that attends it. One can hear what I mean in the words of Derrida, who speaks in the following quote with a voice like that of a scientist pressed by the weight of his research toward a conclusion that violates his presuppositions. Noting that, for Heidegger, “metaphysics always returns . . . and Geist [spirit]” is the form in which it returns, Derrida says:

“It remains to find out whether this promise [Versprechen] is not the promise which, opening every speaking, makes possible the very question and therefore precedes it without belonging to it [as] . . . a yes before all opposition of yes and no . . . . Language always comes before any question, and in the very question, comes down to the promise. This would also be a promise of spirit” (Derrida 1989:94).

What has intruded upon Derrida’s phenomenological line of sight here? If pursued, can such an inquiry lead us in the direction of a pentecostal Geistphilosophie? Yes, such an undertaking would require discernment, inspiration, and imagination. But all of these capacities are eminently pneumatological. After all, “the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination let loose and working with all the freedom of God in the world” (McIntyre 1987:64).

So with this sense of grounding, and with the injunctions of Pannenberg, Marion, and Smith ringing in our ears, I shall endeavor, in Part One, to introduce the reader to three “theological turns” in Continental philosophy as they appear in the work of three prominent phenomenologists: Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jean-Luc Marion. I will organize their insights according to the venerable philosophical categories of “the Good,” “the Beautiful,” and “the True.”

In Part Two, I shall correlate—by way of a reverse chiasm—this philosophical triad with three “philosophical turns” in contemporary theology, which I will organize according to the theological triad of orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxy. The latter categories will be informed primarily by the work of pentecostal theologians James K.A. Smith, Stephen J. Land, and Amos Yong. I will argue that the points of convergence and mutual illumination that become evident in this comparison will suggest pathways for the renewal of theology and philosophy in late modernity. In our conclusion, reminiscent of Caputo’s observation, we will consider the nature of the “and” that joins philosophy and theology, and gives them the character of a “common song.”
PART ONE: THE RENEWAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Heidegger’s Legacy as Omega and Alpha

Before we examine the philosophies of Gadamer, Levinas, and Marion, we must briefly discuss the singular thinker who was their primary interlocutor. For in Heidegger, we encounter both the problematic and the promise of postmodern theology and philosophy.

In 1919, Heidegger proclaimed the Destruktion of metaphysics—or more precisely, the deconstruction or “stripping away” (Abbau) of what had previously served as philosophy. Why? Heidegger claimed that philosophy’s obsession with abstract, ontological “Being” had led to a “forgetfulness” of true being. What was needed was an “overcoming” (Überwindung) of classical metaphysics, so that understanding might be resituated in the vital experience of life; the place from which true philosophy springs.4 In dethroning the objectivist ideal of “Being,” Heidegger abandoned not only classical metaphysics, but also classical theology—which he described as “onto-theology”: the theology of God as ultima ratio, causa sui, and causa prima. Heidegger complained that “before such a God, one can neither fall to one’s knees in awe nor dance” (Heidegger 1969:72).

Heidegger’s project is fertile ground for pentecostal philosophy for three reasons. First, Heidegger’s criticism of “onto-theology” redirects us to the God who is scripturally (rather than philosophically) causa sui—a God before whom one can “dance.”5 Second, Heidegger reminds us (to paraphrase Jung) that abstract theology can become a substitute for the experience of God. Heidegger’s decision to “deny theory in order to make room for practice” underscores that philosophy and religion are nourished primarily by experience, and only secondarily by the positum of representational thinking deduced from experience (Westphal 2001:24). This is a critical consideration for theology as it stands on the brink of postmodernity, for “when theology forgets its own data in religious experience, it presents itself to the world as cognitively empty” (Crowley 1996:198).

Finally, Heidegger presents “Being” not as abstract and inert—rather, “it gives” (es gibt) itself to us in “events of appropriation” (Ereignis) (Gadamer 2002:257).6 Because experience can mediate truth, we are able to transcend the epistemological skepticism that constituted the major aporia of
modernity. And, as we shall see, the idea of the “es gibt” as a dynamic, self-giving, reality is rich in pneumatological implications.7

Levinas, Gadamer, and Marion, enlarge upon these and other Heideggerian themes. Each utilize Heidegger’s insights in their own search for a renewed foundation for philosophy—a “first philosophy” (prima philosophia) by which to “overcome” the aporias of classical metaphysics.

Emmanuel Levinas—The Good: ethics as prima philosophia

Levinas8 agreed with Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology of Gegebenheit: (“givenness”) but relocated its crux in the ethical apprehension of “the Other” (l’Autrui). For Levinas, the “otherness of is Other” is “the beginning” of all wisdom and “of all love” (quoted in Moran 2000:330) —“the very possibility of the beyond” (Levinas 1998:69). Levinas thus redefined “metaphysics” as ethical relationship, and claimed that this metaphysics does indeed “overcome” ontology.” (Westphal 2001:262). Because ethics “precedes” metaphysics and “overcomes” metaphysics, it deserves the rank of prima philosophia (see Levinas 1989a).

Levinas defined the “self” as a “responsivity” called into being by God. For Levinas, “it is through the call to me of God’s infinite otherness in the neighbor, and the responsibility this claims from me, that I become myself” (Levinas 1989b:207, 210 n. 10).9 The Levinasian “Other” is encountered as “judge” and as “charge,” and not predominantly as an “object of knowledge” (Smith 1988:43).

But what does this mean? It is here, in a way perhaps clearer than with Heidegger, that we can begin to deepen our appreciation of the opportunities that Continental phenomenology offers pentecostal philosophy. Modern epistemology was largely Cartesian and objectivist. The subjective “I” perceived objective external objects, whose qualities (as “truth”) were measurable according to the empirical standards of science. Such was “objective reality.” Obviously, such a foundationalist epistemology had little tolerance for aspects of truth that cannot be captured “empirically.”

Levinas, on the other hand, offers us an axiological epistemology, through which normative values (from axios, “worth” or “value”) are “given” to the perceiver through phenomena. What we encounter in the face of the Other is not merely our own subjective projection—for Levinas, the
encounter with “the face” is the experience of “Being” par excellence; it is the quintessential example of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia).\textsuperscript{10}

To speak of the non-projective nature of the power revealed in “the face,” Levinas appealed to a time-honored concept used to indicate transcendence—the “trace.”\textsuperscript{11} In answer to the question, “how do we experience the divine ‘call’ through the face of the Other?” Levinas answered, “The face . . . is ‘the latent birth of meaning.’ But this meaning as trace antedates the event of signification, or to enunciate the point in a more paradoxical register, ‘The beyond from which a face comes signifies as a trace’” (Levinas 1986:355). The source of the “trace” is, to quote the title of one of Levinas’ books, “otherwise than being: or beyond essence” (Levinas 1991).\textsuperscript{12}

By taking Heidegger to task for sublimating beings to “Being,” Levinas showed himself to be in sympathy with pentecostal theologian Samuel Solivan’s emphasis on the imago Dei as “the glue that binds us together”\textsuperscript{13} and “the direct linkage between the Holy Spirit and ourselves” (Solivan 1998:143). More specifically, there is epistemological resonance between Levinas’s philosophy and Solivan’s insistence that the imago Dei is “the seed-bed for orthopathos” (Solivan 1998:143). This appeal to a divinely given ontological nexus within which to ground human epistemology will reappear in our consideration of “participation” (methexis).

Levinas’ thought—while allowing us to stand in the circle of philosophy—yet turns our faces toward Jerusalem. For when Levinas tells us that “The face escapes phenomenology altogether . . . the face escapes sight . . . it is not an experience at all—rather it is a moving out of oneself” (Levinas 1990b:10)\textsuperscript{14}, we find that we are moving not just anywhere, but in a familiar direction. The pre-reflective appeal of the face, through which we feel in our bodies that “we are already beholden to the other” (Levinas 1987:135-136 ) speaks with a voice that we already know: “to see a face is already to hear ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill” (Levinas 1990a). The praxis to which Levinas calls us is an ancient one: willingness to voice the “Here am I” (“me voici”) of Adam, Samuel, Isaiah, et al. In speaking these words, we are delivered inexorably into the presence of an “es gibt” who himself wears the face (panim) of the Lord; the one who “approaches as ‘[thou]’ in a dimension of height” (Levinas 1969:75).
Hans-Georg Gadamer—The Beautiful: aesthetics as *prima philosophia*

Gadamer’s epochal *Truth and Method* was the 20th century’s most influential work on philosophical hermeneutics. While exhaustively wide-ranging and dense in its analysis, at its heart is Gadamer’s contention is that *to kalon* (the “beautiful,” “noble,” “fine”) is “a universal metaphysical concept . . . by no means limited to the aesthetic in the narrower sense” (Gadamer 2002:477). In fact, according to Gadamer, the “structural characteristic of the being of the beautiful” reveals the truth about “the structure of being in general” (Gadamer 2002:481)—and thus stands as one of the foundational threads that binds together human epistemology.

Gadamer holds that “beauty” reveals the evidentness and comprehensibility of phenomenon. “In the beautiful . . . we experience [the] convincing illumination of truth and harmony, which compels the admission: ‘This is true.’” (Gadamer 1986:15). Beauty is like light in that it is invisible in itself; yet visible in what it illuminates (Gadamer 2002:482-483). And yet phenomena are not illuminated *externally*; but from *within*, because “being” is “self-presentation.” (Gadamer 2002:475). Here Gadamer echoes Heidegger’s phenomenological understanding of “truth” as *Gegebenheit*, self-giving, or non-concealment—which Plato was the first to see according to Gadamer (Gadamer 2002:458, 487).

Gadamer points to the nature of language for evidence supporting his premise. He sees language as the medium where we and the world meet, or rather, manifest their original “belonging together” (*Zugehörigkeit*) (Gadamer 2002:474). The essential linguisticality of being suggested to Gadamer that “there are no ontological atoms, no being by itself, only being in an infinite nexus of relationships.” (Wachterhauser 1999:128). It is the participatory “mutuality” of the elements of this nexus that makes the world intelligible—a “world.” And it is through the power of the *kalon* that the elements of this nexus mutually illuminate each other, creating the possibility of understanding. The “illumination” precipitates “truth events” in which “something genuinely revelatory (*zeigend*) occurs, and the aporias of subjectivism are overcome.”

By reinterpreting Plato’s *kalon* in terms of Heidegger, Gadamer laid a postmodern philosophical foundation for axiological epistemology—one that echoes Augustine’s classical epistemology of illuminationism. The same may be said of Gadamer’s retrieval of Platonic “participation” (*methexis*). The reader should take careful note of these two concepts, for they will appear repeatedly in what follows.
What can we make of Gadamer’s focus on the epistemological import of “beauty” from a pentecostal perspective?

Classical pentecostal scholar Stephen E. Parker’s book, *Led by the Spirit: Toward a Practical Theology of Pentecostal Discernment and Decision Making*, suggests that in Gadamer we find a corollary for the aesthetic dimension in the pentecostal understanding of discernment. He notes that a sense of “rightness,” “order,” “harmony,” “completeness,” and “fulfillment” are essential characteristics of being led by the Spirit (Parker 1996:104-110). Echoing Charles V. Gerkin’s observation that pastoral wisdom is the ability to judge “the particular . . . by its relationship to the whole of things,” Parker agrees with Gerkin that Gadamer is helpful in articulating a pentecostal “aesthetic hermeneutic” that maintains that “the good, the true, and the right are discerned through a knowing that transcends the rational alone” (Parker 1996:151).18 We will have more to say about the theological implications of beauty in our later discussion.

Gadamer was a reluctant agnostic—and yet he clearly had an allegiance to what Plato calls “the divine.” In his essay, *The Relevance of Beauty*, Gadamer is uncharacteristically forthcoming in stating that: the kalon “is the invocation of a potentially whole and holy order of things, wherever it may be found” (Gadamer 1986:32).19

Gadamer would have passionately concurred with Pascal that “the heart has reasons which reason does not know.” Like Parker, I see Gadamer’s epistemology as an important and overlooked resource for pentecostal philosophers to use in building a bridge between Pascal’s “knowing heart” and the “heart religion” of Wesley. For like beauty itself, Gadamer’s axiological epistemology succeeds in capturing two profound things: (1) “the unsayability” and yet (2) the “presence” of that which is “whole and holy” (Pippin 2002:231).

Jean-Luc Marion—The True: donation as prima philosophia

In posing the question of “es gibt,” Heidegger framed a doorway to a new “mysticism of Being” (*Seinmystik*)—a portal he, himself, refused to enter (Schrag 2002:30). Gadamer stepped at least toward that door in his metaphysics of to kalon and to agathon. Levinas boldly strode through that door in his radical turn toward alterity (both human and divine). Finally, it may be argued that
Marion solidly plants himself on the other side of the doorway by reframing the *es gibt theologically* in terms of charity or “donation.”

Marion makes this advance in the process of criticizing Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology, so some background is in order. As Husserl had drawn the ground rules of phenomenology, phenomena (as such) do indeed “give themselves,” but in a form that remain “constituted” in some sense by the “intentionality” of the ego. The “principle of principles” practiced in phenomenology is “reduction” (from *reducere*, or “leading back”), which involves the “bracketing,” or examination of phenomena as received. Marion’s concern is that Husserl’s reduction gives allows no place for the appearance of God (or the religious phenomenon), for the unconditioned cannot be represented in terms of finite human intentionality. Marion here echoes Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology, where—Heidegger argued—God was likewise not allowed to appear.

In seeking for a solution, Marion asks: “what is ‘that through which God is God’ even in philosophy?” (Marion 1997:284). His answer: “God is *agape*” (1 John 4:8). This is the supreme expression of divine intentionality. So in contrast to onto-theology, “Being” is not the first name of God; *charity, agape* is. In contrast to Husserlian “giveness” Marion offers us a “radical phenomenology” based upon divine *donation*, which makes possible a phenomenological reduction that is open to transcendence.

Marion calls the phenomenon characterized by *donation* a “saturated phenomenon.” Such a phenomenon overflows the “horizon” of our own intentionality and directs our attention always beyond itself, toward an endless surplus, and toward a vision that is (in Levinas’ words) “irreducible to comprehension.” It thus “transpierces” both visible things and the self (Marion 1991:11, 17).

Marion uses the language of “idol” and “icon” to clarify his meaning. The “idolatrous gaze” stops at the surface of what it sees because it sees only what it allows—and it allows “no invisible” (Marion 1991:13). The idolatrous seer sees only an “invisible mirror” of the idolatrous intentionality of the seer—which makes its object into an “idol.” In contrast, the “iconic gaze” is open to the invisible. Because it does not “equate what is given to sight with the God who gives sight” (Marion 1991:23, 202), that phenomenon becomes iconic; sacramental. Through the “icon”: “the gaze of the invisible, in person, aims at man . . . in a face that gazes at our gazes” (Marion 1991:19-21) in such a way that “the human gaze is engulfed . . . [and] does not cease.” There, we
“watch the tide of the invisible come in,” for [the icon] “offers an abyss that the eyes of men never finish probing” (Marion 1991:19-21).

So, what might Marion’s work signal (a) for the renewal of metaphysics; and (b) for pentecostal philosophy?

First, for metaphysics: Marion is confident that “the transitivity of ‘metaphysics’ does not lead to its Ende, but to its transcendence”—or better, to its renewal. Marion’s recent writing clearly expresses his conviction that Heidegger labored not to eradicate metaphysics, but to bring forth “a meta-metaphysics” (Marion 1997:283). Marion’s “radical phenomenology” is a significant development towards achieving such a renewal.

Second, for pentecostal philosophy: The theological framework of Marion’s phenomenology is far from secondary to his project—hence discussion of a “theological turn” in phenomenology by Janicaud and others (Janicaud 2000). Also, Marion echoes Heidegger’s call to “deny theory in order to make room for practice” in his stress on the importance of the role of the perceiver in iconic perception. He thus effectively bridges Heidegger’s suggested praxis of Gelassenheit—“imploring Being to speak”—and the essentially performative approach favored by pentecostals (quoted in Moran 2000:330). We shall return to the importance of Marion’s doxological emphasis and to the epistemological significance of orthopathos shortly.

Ultimately, Marion sees Christ the Logos as the paradigmatic “gift”—and the Trinitarian God, who is “beyond Being” as the source of all “donation.” There are thus palpable participatory and incarnational elements in Marion’s phenomenology. James K. A. Smith’s own appropriation of Levinas and Marion’s have lead him towards positing a Christian phenomenology that is both incarnational and emphasizes the “positive” aspects of mystery (Smith 2002:160).

I would concur. In saying so, I am reminded of Edith Stein’s description of God as plenitude (Fülle) that admits no non-being (Nichtsein)—an echo of the classical understanding that the God who is “beyond Being” is also the God who “saturates” creation, filling “all in all.”
PART TWO—PENTECOSTAL THEOLOGY AND THE RENEWAL OF METAPHYSICS

Steven J. Land and the “Alpha” of Pentecostal Theology 28

We shall now initiate our chiasm, correlating the philosophies of Levinas, Gadamer, and Marion, in reverse order, with pentecostal and theological interlocutors James K. A Smith (“orthodoxy”); Stephen Land (“orthopathy”); and Amos Yong (“orthopraxy”).

This trilogy of orthodoxy-orthopathy-orthodoxy is drawn from Land’s analysis in his Pentecostal Spirituality: A Passion for the Kingdom:

> When *theologia* is restored to its ancient meaning, the dichotomization that so often occurs or is perceived between theology and spirituality can be overcome . . . . To state this claim in a more formal way: orthodoxy (right praise-confession), orthopathy (right affections) and orthopraxy (right praxis) are related in a way analogous to the interrelations of the Holy Trinity. God who is Spirit creates in humanity a spirituality which is at once cognitive, affective and behavioral, thus driving toward a unified epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. (Land 1994:41)

Of course, a “unified epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics” is, precisely the goal of our pursuit, so Land suggests a lot to us here. In addition, he makes a subtle inference about the fundamental reality that makes such unification possible. In this sense, his reference to the nature of perichoretic “interrelations of the Holy Trinity” is not merely analogical.

Let me expand upon this point. It would be possible for someone to read this article as an attempt to “smuggle” pentecostal thinking into a conversation about philosophy under the cloak of theology. Nothing could be further from the truth. Heidegger and Derrida’s observation that “metaphysics always returns . . . and Geist [spirit]” is the form in which it returns” is not, on our reading, a call to reappropriate the Hegelian Geist. It rather foreshadows our focus in Part II on pneumatology—the trinitarian “power that connects.” For pneumatology is more than a confessional exercise—it is a description of a robustly metaphysical reality that can lend ontological density, existentiality, and profundity to the philosophical ideas we have encountered.

Thus, the inclusion of the pentecostal interlocutors we are about to meet does more than round out the “diversity of tongues” constituting our symposium. It opens the dialogue to include a discussion of the singular power without which our diverse tongues are finally empty of coherence, meaning, or even existence.
“Orthodoxy”: James K. A. Smith’s participatory ontology

In two recent books, James K. A. Smith has attempted to parse out the implications of a muscular new theological movement (or “sensibility,” as some would prefer) called Radical Orthodoxy (RO) (Smith 2003b, Smith/Olthuis 2005). Smith has a host of reasons for this focus. He is clearly fascinated by the philosophical richness of RO, which demonstrates a state-of-the-art familiarity with postmodern Continental philosophers such as Marion and Levinas. He is also interested in the mutual critiques Reformed theology and RO can offer each other. But it is Smith’s affinities as a pentecostal philosopher that most intrigue us here. Smith is anxious that pentecostal theology converse with RO because, as Smith sees it, RO’s concerns mirror those at the heart of the pentecostal worldview: a radical openness to both divine and human alterity; the pneumatological gifting of the ecclesial community; the incarnational and healing presence and activity of the Spirit; an affective and revelational epistemology; and an emphasis on social justice for the marginalized (Smith 2003c:109-110).

Smith has particularly attempted to engage in this conversation through his construction of a participatory ontology. While Smith admits to having a “Reformed allergy” to RO iterations of participation that he feels are too Platonic (See particularly Smith 2005), he does embrace the participatory paradigm as nuanced “creationally,” “incarnationally,” and “pneumatologically.” Indeed, he considers such a move to be an essential task of postmodern theology—for participation is the “counter-ontology” needed to overcome the closed and autonomous metaphysics of secularity, which falsely proclaims that we can understand creation without reference to a Creator. Participatory ontology is the antidote to this aberrant nihilism.

Other contemporary pentecostal theologians have noted the affinity between pneumatology and participation. D. Lyle Dabney describes the Spirit as “the Wholly Other with whom we are not identical and yet with whom we are always related” (Dabney 1996:161). In a single astonishing paragraph, Dabney both articulates a succinct pneumatic ontology and epistemology, and grants us an immensely useful neologism:

[T]he Spirit of God is not human spirit aspiring to the divine, but neither is it the subjectivity of God making an object of the human. Indeed, rather than subjective or objective, the Spirit is better conceived as transjective; that is to say, that by which we as individuals are transcended, engaged, oriented beyond ourselves, and related to God and neighbor from the beginning” (Dabney 1996:161).
Taking Acts 2:17a as his point of departure, Amos Yong has likewise suggested that the Spirit’s outpouring on “all flesh” expresses a paradigm in which “the chasm between transcendence and creation is overcome” and the material world is sacramentalized. “In this pneumatological scheme of things, then, there is no absolutely other” (Yong 2006:19-23) and the opposition of spirit and nature is seen to be false (Yong 2005:268). The Spirit “infuses the orders of creation with a teleological dynamic” (Yong 2005:282)—providing the axiological effulgence so central to the epistemologies we have encountered in Levinas, Gadamer, and Marion.

Dabney, Yong, and RO agree with Smith’s Augustinian inference that all that is, is only because it is upheld by the power of the Spirit. Yet, tempered by his Reformed commitments, Smith is moved to ask: “Does a participatory ontology lead us to conclude that everything is within the realm of the kingdom of the beloved Son?” (Smith 2006:5). To ensure that it does not slide toward sheer immanence, Smith sets forth an “intensity model” of participation. While existents must structurally participate in the giftedness of creation to exist, they do not all participate as such with the same intensity or directionality. The horizon of the Fall indicates that a dis-ordering and de-intensification of creation has occurred—just as the horizon of salvation history shows that the re-ordering and restoration of creation toward and in God is possible through the Spirit (Smith 2006:5-6).

In light of Smith’s concerns, let us facilitate our chiasm, and bring Marion’s voice into the conversation. Marion is en garde not only against creeping immanence, but also against the onto-theological reduction of God. How, then, does he nuance participation?

We are, in part, already familiar with the answer. Marion observes: “for us, as for all the beings of the world, it is first necessary ‘to be’ in order . . . ‘to live and to move’ (Acts 17:28)” (Marion 1991:xx). But God does not need to “play Hamlet.” Because “God is love,” we may say that he “loves before being.”—he only “is” as he embodies himself “in order to love more closely . . . those who, themselves, have first to be” (Marion 1991:xx).

Marion is a Thomist in holding that God is the cause of all that exists (Deus est causa universalis totius esse). Existentes thus participate in the reason of God and in the originary donation of creation, from which they are in no wise separable. Marion, however, seems to incline toward thinking donation primarily as charity rather than esse, and toward his own “intensity model” of participation. He chooses to present the Eucharist as the best paradigm for participation. We simultaneously participate in the elements of the sacraments and in the mystical body of Christ.
— clearly a hierarchy of participatory reality. And it is through charity that we ourselves vary the depth and intensity of our participation in divine reality epistemologically, as we have seen in our exploration of Marion’s “saturated phenomena.”

It is here that Marion’s understanding of participation/donation converges with our theme of orthodoxy. Marion’s sacramental inclination leads him to read the central intent of “ortho-doxa” in terms of its classical root meaning of “right praise.” Recall that for Marion, the source of donation is “irreducible to comprehension” (Marion 1991:23, 202). Marion therefore insists that “predication must yield to praise—which itself also, maintains a discourse. . . . Only then can discourse be reborn, but as an enjoyment, a jubilation, a praise” (Marion 1991:106-107).

In a similar way, Smith notes that Augustine recognizes that praise (orthodoxa) “is an order of discourse which is “more affective than cognitive” (Smith 2002:128). It is possible to speak truly of God only in the mode of praise, which is “a non-objectifying, non-positivistic mode of conceptualization which does not reduce God to a concept, but rather employs language in such a way that respects God’s transcendence and refers the listener to experience the thing itself” (Smith 2002:128). The words of the orthodox “predicator” thus become something more than “predications”—they become “iconic pointers which deflect the gaze beyond themselves” (Smith 2002:129). And so we find a conjunction between Smith, and Marion’s “iconic gaze.”

Orthodoxy, then, is “right praise” which is at once participatory “right knowledge.” Such a “theology of presence” could not be more compatible with the pentecostal emphasis that theology should be the fruit of our encounter with the Spirit, and that “experiencers are always the primal witnesses” (Toynbee 1973:48).

“Orthopathy”: Stephen J. Land’s epistemology of “graced affections”

Gadamer, Levinas, and Marion have invited us to rethink epistemology along axiological lines. But far from being a postmodern innovation, the gnosiological power of the affections have been the gold standard of religious consciousness from time immemorial. As the author of the Cloud of Unknowing observed, “Where the mind fails . . . love becomes the only way forward.” Love is not
only a virtue, it is a power (virtus); and not just a power, but a power to know; a faculty” (Toynbee 1973:71). To paraphrase the beloved disciple, “those who love . . . know” (1 John 4:7).

That love is a faculty was certainly not lost on the Church Fathers. Evagrius of Pontus (4th century) defined theologia as the realm of prayer: “If you are a theologian, you pray in truth; if you pray in truth, you are a theologian” (Louth 1981:111). Evagrius’ thinking infused the Macarian homilies—which themselves influenced Wesley’s theology.

So it is not surprising that it is through Wesleyan theology that the modern understanding of orthopathy has entered pentecostal thinking. T.H. Runyon first coined the term “orthopathy” in 1987. He identified orthopathy as “a necessary but currently missing complement to orthodoxy and orthopraxy” (Runyon 1988:4). Runyon described orthopathy as an event that occurs “between the Divine Source and human participant” involving four factors: (1) the divine source, which makes impressions on the spiritual senses of the human beings; (2) the intention (telos) of the source for the human being; (3) the transformation brought about through the experience; and (4) the feelings that accompany the experience (Runyon 1988:4).

Steven J. Land’s landmark treatment of orthopathy in Pentecostal Spirituality: A Passion for the Kingdom, anchors it not only in the mutuality of theology and spirituality, but also in the classical pentecostal apocalyptic affections, and the eschatological motions of the Trinity. Like Edwards and Wesley, Land maintains that Christianity is “fundamentally . . . a matter of certain affections” (Land 1994:184). But Christianity is also “the living out of a cosmic drama” (Land 1994:183). This being the case, Land argues that the apocalyptic affections that historically characterize pentecostalism must be broadened to represent properly the sweep of orthopathy. Specifically, the “soon-coming” apocalyptic expectation of early pentecostalism must be augmented by the realization that “the goal of creation is not annihilation but transformation; just as the goal for humans is new creation” (Land 1994:200). All of history is salvation history; a history that is (from the divine side) a progression from the Father through the Son in the Spirit, and (from the human side) from the reception of the Spirit through the Son to the Father” who means to be all-in-all (Land 1994:200). For the individual, this pilgrimage involves “crisis-development,” which moves forward “not passively, but passionately” (Land 1994:201). Salvation is a passion for the God who is at work eschatologically in all things—a passion that loves others in light of our shared eschatological vocation.
Land maintains that “to be saved is . . . to love,” and that love is “the integrating center of affective soteriological transformation” (Land 1994:202). Land frames the question of entire sanctification not in terms of subsequence or eradication, but in terms of affective transformation wrought by “a participatory following of Christ” (Land 1994:202). Sin is not the absence of moral perfection, but the willful betrayal of this vocation. Through ongoing repentance, love “wounds and heals” our will, and in the process, “passion becomes compassion” (Land 1994:202).

Through this process of affective transformation we are sanctified—that is, we move from half-heartedness to wholeheartedness. It is this “abiding in Christ wholeheartedly in love” that is “the core of spirituality” (Land 1994:204). “As Calvary is central in salvation history so sanctification as moral integration or wholehearted love is central in salvation as participation in the divine life” (Land 1994:205). We see in Land not only a pentecostal iteration of participation, but also ways in which Wesleyan-Holiness orthopathy—as “crisis development”—echoes Smith’s concept of participation as involving shifts in “intensity” and “directionality.”

Theologically, it is hard to improve on Land’s incisive analysis of orthopathy. But philosophically, questions remain to be explored. At passion’s heart is its object: beauty. But what is beauty? Can Gadamer, our chiastic interlocutor, aid us in answering this question and forging closure between philosophical and theological aesthetics?

Gadamer clearly agreed with Philip Toynbee that “There are moments when we have the sense that everything which comes to our attention is trying to convey a message to us”; a message that is not only “good” but “of the good” (Toynbee 1973:30-31). Gadamer presses the question of the meaning of the *ex gibt* forward in this direction when he identifies *to kalon* as a “trace” “of the good” (or of the “whole and holy” *to agathon*). And Gadamer makes significant strides toward renewing philosophy by arguing that in *Erfahrung*, we have “an encounter with something that asserts itself as truth” in a suprasubjective way” (Gadamer 2002:489). Recall Parker’s linkage, via Gadamer, of the pentecostal “aesthetic hermeneutic” to a transrational, objective source that is “good, true, and right.”

“Something,” yes—but not a “someone.” It is here that pentecostal philosophy must lodge a critique against Gadamer. Just as John Macquarrie criticized Heidegger for touting the voice of Being, but making it a voice without a “Who,” (Macquarrie 1968:51-60) pentecostal theology not only asks whose voice speaks in beauty, but dares to set forth an answer.
What is that answer, and (philosophically) how is it an answer? Thomas Aquinas observed that the Greek term for beauty (καλός) was strikingly similar to καλέω (to call). He explained this consonance by declaring that God, as the cause of beauty—through beauty—calls us to himself to accomplish his purposes (McInerny 1998). Beauty, then is beauty—and a true signifier of “The Good”—in that it speaks with an eschatological voice.

And so to kalon is all that Gadamer suggested—and more. Beauty is, as Gadamer said, a “reflection” of a “supraterrestrial” yet “immanent” reality (Pippin 2002:231). But it is also a wound and a promise; an eschatological premonition, and a call to arms to the compassionate heart. RO theologian Graham Ward therefore speaks of beauty as Christ’s “watermark within creation . . . . What is re-cognized in the beautiful, as the beautiful, is the paradisial,” that is, “creation . . . in terms of its Christic orientation and perfection” (Ward 2003:43).

Orthopathy, and beauty, are thus compelling elements in any postmodern pentecostal philosophy. Echoing also the theme of participation, David Nichols has commented that “a ‘spiritual’ ontology” based on an “analogy of love as opposed to [an] analogy of faith or being” should serve as the basis for a systematic theology “worthy of the name Pentecostal” (see Nichols 1984:57-76). Nichols’ suggestion sounds, in fact, as if he has arrived at a similar conclusion as Gadamer and Marion—by way of Azusa St. rather than Marburg or Paris.

“Orthopraxy”: Amos Yong: Engagement and the Pneumatological Imagination

Søren Kierkegaard blazed his way to the heart of things in his characteristic manner in writing: “What I really lack is to be clear in my mind what I am to do, not what I am to know, except insofar as a certain understanding must precede every action” (Kierkegaard 1958:44). If—as we suggested regarding orthopathy—love is a faculty (“to love is to know”) it is no less true, with regard to orthopraxy, that the will is a faculty (“to do is to know”; John 7:17). Since to do is also to be/become, orthopraxy is, in some sense, the “bottom line” both epistemologically and ontologically. I have therefore reserved it for our final consideration.
We will break with form in this section and begin by reviewing the thinking of our chiastic interlocutor—in this case, Levinas. Levinas’s thought carries powerful implications for orthopraxis in that he laid the groundwork for the development of ethics as a postfoundational *prima philosophia*. But while his positive contributions in this respect are unquestionable, there are certain problems associated with his work. For example, questions have been raised about whether his phenomenology is curtailed by the boundaries of the “face.” Whereas Buber included non-humans and nature within the purview of the “thou,” Levinas was disinclined to do so (Smith 1988:42). More problematic are concerns regarding Levinas’s status as an “exteriority thinker.” Can one persuasively set forth a phenomenology of *radical* alterity? Or is this a tautology?

Having posed these questions, we are free to ask if pentecostal philosophy can help us in answering them.

To search for such an answer, we turn to pentecostal theologian Amos Yong and his *magnum opus* (so far) *Spirit, Word, Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective*. As we shall see, Yong’s answers to Levinas’ conundrums are to be found in his sustained articulation of the metaphysical implications of pneumatology.

Levinas’ point of departure from Heidegger was his objection to Heidegger’s sublimating of beings to Being (*Sein*) as a categorical “horizon.” What kind of ontology does Yong posit? One in which the *év* is not *Sein*, but *pneuma*. Yong refers to this approach as “foundational pneumatology.” In a way reminiscent of RO, Yong argues that because the Spirit is ubiquitous in creation, the pneumatological features of the world and of human life are likewise ubiquitous and publicly discernable. Reason, morality, beauty, creativity, relationality, life, and existence *are* pneumatological phenomena. The nature and activity of the Spirit therefore form the “categorical horizon” of human experience. Spirit defines creation in such a way that transcendence “haunts” every corner of being. In pneumatic relationality, “the finite borders on the infinite” at all times and places (Yong 2002:144). Because “all concrete things are what they are precisely as modal and relational realities . . . nothing exists solely as its phenomenological manifestation” (Yong 2002:138, 145, 201). Here we meet again with the profound implications of participation highlighted by RO, for which “all there is *is* only because it is *more* than it is.”

Epistemologically speaking, we gain eyes to recognize the activity of the Spirit as such, through what Yong calls the “Pneumatological Imagination.” Rather than being a subjective locus for projection, the Pneumatic Imagination is a locus of values-cognition, rationality, spiritual
insight, and worldmaking. In a way that resonates well with the structure of our study, Yong describes the Pneumatological Imagination as “an aspect of cognition” that is “holistically . . . driven . . . toward the beautiful, the true, and the good” (Yong 2002:129). Yong insists that the axiological norms that guide cognition “are not simply cognitive constructions imposed on the world”; rather, they are “given, at least in part, by the objects of experience to the imagination” (Yong 2002:132). Yong’s axiological epistemology is thus able to overcome “the dualism between fact and value” (Yong 2002:131) in the same way that Gadamer and Levinas’ axiological epistemologies overcome “the aporias of subjectivism.”

Yong’s understanding of the underpinning of ethics—foundational pneumatology—allows him to address the question of “radical alterity” that dogged Levinas. For Yong, the Spirit creates alterity without violence to Being or beings. Neither God nor l’Autrui need be either radically “otherwise than Being” or “radically other,” for Spirit maintains alterity in a participational key. Thus Yong writes: “What Levinas call proximity is what Christians call the Spirit—the Spirit of God being the same breath that animates myself and the other, and causes me to recognize the other, empathize with the other, and fulfill obligations in response to the demands of the other” (Yong 2002:192). He concludes: “The whole point of pneuma in the Christian tradition is to point away from being toward relationality” (Yong 2002:194).

As the aim of philosophy is to love wisdom and to live it, so the purpose of the Pneumatological Imagination is that we be able to conceive the world in its wholeness and engage it as such. Yong persuasively argues that Spirit is the cosmological reality that defines how creatures created in the image of God should normatively engage with one another (Yong 2002:132). This argument sits well with Levinas’s contention that ethics is prima philosophia.

Although he is sometimes taken to task for abstractness in his dense and brilliant work, I would argue that Yong’s primary intent is engagement. Indeed all of chapter five and part of chapter six of Spirit-Word-Community are devoted to this theme. Yong is characteristically pentecostal in this regard, and in his sensitivity to that fact that, at the end of the day, our theology is only as good as our praxis. In his recent book, The Spirit Poured Out on All Flesh, Yong argues that any global pentecostal theology must be “confessionally located” in the sense that it is “intensely practical” (Yong 2005:29). Marion would agree with Yong wholeheartedly in this regard—for, in his words, “love is not spoken, in the end, it is made” (Marion 1991:106-107).
CONCLUSION: PNEUMATOLOGY AND THE “RE-TURNING” OF THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

I wish to conclude not with a summary of the points we have covered, but with some questions and comments that will leave the tenor of our inquiry reverberating in the mind of the reader.

The philosophical quest for an “overcoming” (Überwindung) of metaphysics is itself a quest for transcendence and renewal. As we have seen, in pursuing this quest, some of the magi of Continental philosophy have journeyed far from the Babylon of modernity to gather in silence (Gelassenheit) and await a new light; a new word. As Christian theologians and philosophers, we have riches to share with these pilgrims. I have suggested that Heidegger and Derrida were correct in their prophetic intimation that “metaphysics always returns” and that “Geist [spirit]” is the form in which it can return. More specifically, I have proposed that the “meta-metaphysics” that embodies the true “overcoming” of metaphysics according to Marion is, at heart, pneumatological.

But while theology has much to share with philosophy in late modernity, I also believe that there is much that we can learn from our phenomenological interlocutors about our own journey of “overcoming.” The following quotation from Marion’s “The ‘end of metaphysics’ as a possibility” contains some interesting implications for all aspiring theologians and philosophers of renewal.

... philosophy is not defined directly by wisdom (or for that matter by knowledge, and even less so by science or representation), but by its strange, complex, and unquestioned relation to wisdom. A relation of affinity, of inclination, of familiarity, of desire, and lack of it as well—a relation to what it lacks and loves to possess. Philosophy does not know wisdom, does not produce it, but reaches for it, anticipates it like a gift one would offer. In sum, it might be that in order to define philosophy, especially after metaphysics and perhaps even beyond the question of being, we cannot follow any other path than that indicated by the question: “What speaks in the ‘It gives’?” (Marion 2003:183-184).

In a parallel sense, would it not also be true to say that theology is defined directly not by God, but by theology’s “strange, complex, and unquestioned relation to God?”—a relation of “affinity, of inclination, of familiarity, of desire, and lack of it as well?” Following on, is it not also true that theology, as a second order discourse, does not “produce” God, but “reaches for and anticipates God—like a gift?” Answered in the affirmative, these questions would seem to compel us to acknowledge the intrinsically doxological vocation of theology. Such a confession is certainly in keeping with a pentecostal emphasis. For if theology is defined not directly by God, but through a reflective narrative about our strange and complex relation to God as gift, then we must inquire...
“Who gives” in grace, in sanctification, in the charismata, and—most especially—in the Holy Spirit. This inquiry must be a performative inquiry; an inquiry based upon ascesis and reception.

In terms of renewal, such a methodology requires a new quality of theological inquiry. Perhaps we can characterize this quality as a “second naïveté” regarding the Spirit. We have every theological and existential warrant for believing that RO is correct in claiming that there is no territory independent of God in life or in the world. Therefore we must be willing to be open to—and interrogated by—an “enspirited universe,” and to be robustly metaphysical in thinking through the implications of what meets us in such encounters. All this is in keeping with philosophy and theology as “confessional” enterprises, as Caputo has suggested.

For pentecostal philosophy, this form of inquiry must be pursued outside as well as inside dogmatic categories of discourse. For in postmodernity the “argument” (if it may be called such) is no longer between those who confine themselves to the book of nature and those who confine themselves to the books of scripture; the “argument” is about how best to understand the meaning of human experience and existence as a whole. So we must be willing to ask holistically “who gives?” in goodness, in truth, in beauty, in justice, in physics, in biology, in the religions. Such an inquiry constitutes philosophy. Pursued as we have suggested, this inquiry will not lead us back to the faux philosophies of modernity, but rather in the direction of a robustly Christian—even a robustly pentecostal—philosophy that “closes the gap between metaphysics and spirituality.

As we have seen, the principle of “givenness”—the “magic word” of phenomenology—affords Christian philosophy a powerful tool with which to leverage such metaphysical renewal. Robert Sokolowski highlights this point: “[contemporary] phenomenology breaks out of modernity and permits a restoration of the convictions that animated ancient and medieval philosophy” because “like premodern philosophy, phenomenology understands reason as ordered toward truth” (Sokolowski 2000:202-203). We have seen this emphasis play out powerfully in the axiological epistemologies of Marion, Levinas, Gadamer, Land, Smith, and Yong. It is this “axiological confidence” that is largely responsible for the “theological turn” in Continental phenomenology. Because of it, we stand poised to make a liberating leap beyond the aporia of modern epistemological skepticism.

Marion portrays our situation strikingly: “Phenomenology goes beyond metaphysics . . . to allow an ultimately radical empiricism to unfold—ultimately radical because it no longer limits itself to sensible intuition, but admits all intuition that is primarily donative” (Marion 1997:286).
Marion’s confident focus on “radical modes of experience” is only slightly shy of being an engraved invitation for pentecostal philosophers to push forward in instituting their own Geistphilosophie by drawing boldly on constructive resources such as the participatory illuminationism of Smith and RO, the orthopathos of Land, and Yong’s Pneumatological Imagination.

It is generally known that pentecostal theology has been anticipating an “orthopathic turn” and the development of an affective epistemology for some time. Why not now? Our study has both suggested rich philosophical underpinnings for such a move and set forth a strong rationale for its urgency. The antidote to opaque and atheological forms of theological rationalism is an incarnational, participational, and orthopathic epistemology of the “first Interlocutor”—the Spirit.

Just as “God” (as “love”) is both verb and noun, “God” (as “Spirit”) is also conjunctive. And it is here that we find the answer to the question we set ourselves in the introduction: What is the nature of the “and” that gives philosophy and religion the character of “a common ‘song?’” It is Spirit, who blows through both, uniting the good, the true, and the beautiful; harmonizing and informing orthopraxy, orthodoxy, and orthopathy; and mediating the ever-present, partially realized possibility of God.

In discovering—or rediscovering—this truth, we are positioned for the most glorious of “overcomings”—one in which are “lost in wonder, love, and praise.”
ENDNOTES

1 For the sake of consistency, I will render “pentecostal” in the lower case throughout.

2 I am happy to report that during the 2006 convention in Pasadena the Philosophical Interest Group sessions of the Society for Pentecostal Studies attracted overflow crowds of pentecostal philosophers from as far away as Sweden.

3 This paper is, in part, a response to Smith’s charge. Theology without philosophy becomes superficial; theology without philosophy becomes irrelevant—and, in the words of my colleague, Dr. Jim Flynn: “irrelevance is irreverence.”

4 According to Heidegger, “understanding” is not something we possess; it is our mode of being-in-the-world, and “world” is “prior to any separation of self and world in the objective sense.” This historically conditioned facticity of human existence is called by Heidegger Dasein (“there-being”). Dasein is the “clearing within being” in which being manifests itself as “truth” (Grk. aletheia; “un-concealment”). Such truth is never atemporal or all-inclusive. It is always both concealment and unconcealment (Palmer 1969:132).

5 This move makes it possible to transpose metaphysics into a postfoundational key—a critically important gift.

6 Heidegger said that the “magic word” of phenomenology is Gegebenheit; (“givenness”).

7 Heidegger went on to advance the praxis of Gelassenheit, an “attentive silence” before Being that implores Being to speak. Such a “worshipful” and receptive posture—while sub-Christian—resonates in terms of orthopraxis with the ancient lex orendi, as well as with the pentecostal emphasis on “tarrying” for the touch of the Spirit.

8 Levinas (1906-1995) studied with Husserl, Heidegger, and Gabriel Marcel, and was a colleague of Sartre, Derrida, and other famous European phenomenologists. He was of Orthodox Jewish extraction, and published in the fields of Talmudic studies and Jewish mysticism as well as philosophy.

9 If the face of the neighbor is obscured by objectification, so is the voice of God who calls us to love our neighbor. Levinas’ antidote: “We must think God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to establish a relation irreducible to comprehension” (Levinas 1996:5, 7-8). We shall note this apophatic strain in Marion 1997 as well.

10 God is present for Levinas as commandment rather than as a being. In a manner consistent both with Jewish theology and with Heidegger, God is known not intellectually as prima causa, but experientially, in “encounter.”

11 For example, Augustine spoke of vestigia Dei; “traces” of the divine in created things. As we shall see, Gadamer’s concept of beauty (to kalon) is also a trace par excellence.

12 Levinas here follows Heidegger’s suggestion that the post onto-theological God is “beyond being,” as being was classically conceived. Yong observes: “Levinas’ challenge to reconceive of the divine Infinity as ‘otherwise than being or beyond essence’ should be applauded. The whole point of pneuma in the Christian theological tradition is to point away from being toward relationality” (Yong 2002:192-193).

13 He also refers to the imago Dei as ; and “a witness to all that seeks to separate us one from the other” (Solivan 1998:143).

14 Emphasis added.

15 Gadamer calls this “illumination” a “metaphysics of light,” or Vorscheinen (Gadamer 2002:115).

16 Gadamer reaches back to the elemental philosophical paradox of “the one and the many” to explain participation: “Someone understands what cognition, knowing, insight is only when he understands how it can be that one and one are two and how ‘the two’ [the integer two] is [itself] one.” By the same token, Gadamer, like Plato, envisions
justice, reason, appetite, spirit, human nature, virtue, education, responsibility, society, truth, goodness, as threads in a single “fabric.” Each “participates” in the other, yet each is logically distinct from the others—thereby making language, understanding, and existence possible (Gadamer 1980:135). Participation, in a Christianized form, came to play an important role in the theologies of Eastern Orthodoxy, Augustine, and Aquinas.

As an aside, I see no reason to consider Gadamer a “closet essentialist,” as some have alleged, for Gadamer rejected the existence of the so-called Platonic Forms or Ideas as transcendental, discrete entities. He stated: “In my opinion, any theory of the doctrine of Ideas which made the latter look like Eleatic atomism was always inadequate and Plato himself seems to have recognized that at an early stage” (Gadamer 1980:135). Gadamer (following Plato, as he read Plato) speaks of the “deep truths” of ontology, not in terms of a priori essences, but as Richtungssinn; as “direction[s] of meaning that can evolve and change over time, without fracturing into a myriad of mutually exclusive positions whose difference is beyond all reconciliation” (Wachterhauser 1999:53). Thus, he offers us an ontology similar to contemporary postfoundationalists such as Nancey Murphy.

Recall that Levinas, the truth of the “trace” is “otherwise than being or beyond essence.” Analogously, Gadamer declares that while the kalon illuminates meaning, it cannot be said to be the source of meaning. That role is reserved for to agathon—“the good”—which is “that which bestows unity rather than that which is itself a one. It is after all, beyond all being” (Gadamer 1978:50).

Emphasis added. Jonathan Edwards likewise considered beauty as the most exalted of the transcendentals.

Against Descartes (and with Kant) Husserl maintained that thinking is not an “internal composition” but rather a medley of thought and (external) experience; a “categorical presentation.” Heidegger’s work is, in large part, an extrapolation of this insight.

In this way, the Cartesian rift between perceiver and object is overcome.

Marion is reading Husserl against himself in insisting that “reduction” must be more generously interpreted.

Marion’s insistence that “the invisible” that reveals itself in the icon is “irreducible to comprehension” parallels Levinas and Gadamer’s emphasis that the truth of aletheia is transconceptual.

See also Westphal 2001:267-270.

Recall that Gadamer says that through Vorscheinen “phenomena are not illuminated externally; but from within.” This is precisely the dynamic Greek iconography attempts to capture aesthetically.

Any phenomenon may function as iconic or idolatrous.

Smith questions whether Marion’s phenomenology is incarnational enough—or, more specifically, whether it accords sufficiently with Aquinas’ secundum modum recipientis recipitur: that revelation must be received “according to the condition of the receiver” (see Smith 2002, chapters 2 and 5). I am inclined to suspect that the disparities he senses may be attributed to differences of emphasis.

Arguably, Land’s book, as the first in the JPT Supplement Series, announced the advent of the maturation of pentecostal theology.

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RO is “radical” in that it seeks to retrieve the wisdom of the premodern “roots” (radix) of the faith. In terms of ontology, this means a retrieval of the notion of participation (methexis). In terms of epistemology, it means a return
to the Augustinian notion that all knowing is rooted in divine illumination (Milbank/Ward/Pickstock 1999:1-2).  

31 It remains to be seen whether Smith’s critique of participation in RO is more correlative than corrective.  

32 Smith (and RO) are saying much that Christianity badly needs to say regarding the central impasse that must be bridged to renew metaphysics and theology. They succinctly proclaim the demise of the dualistic consensus that constituted modernity and dogmatically excluded the transcendent from consciousness and culture. The abolition of false dualisms such as “faith and reason” make it possible for both theology and philosophy to be “unapologetically confessional” and “unapologetically theological” in mainstream discourse (See Smith 2003b:74, 186-187, 189).  

33 As articulated by RO: “[T]he theological perspective of participation actually saves the appearances by exceeding them. It recognizes that materialism and spiritualism are false alternatives, since if there is only finite matter there is not even that, and that for phenomena really to be there they must be more than there. . . . [Through this insistence] one is not ethereally taking leave of [the] density [of things]. On the contrary, one is insisting that behind this density resides an even greater density . . . This is to say that all there is is only because it is more than it is” (Milbank/Ward/Pickstock 1999:4).  

34 To my ear, Smith’s premise here is reminiscent of Barth’s view that the second covenant is an “intensification” of the first covenant.  

35 Here was see resonance with Smith’s incarnational emphasis: “God gives Himself to be known insofar as he gives Himself—according to the horizon of the gift itself” (Marion 1991:xxiv).  

36 Marion has been criticized for departing from St. Thomas’s identification of God and esse. It is true that Marion questions Aquinas’s decision to substitute esse for the good (bonum; sumnum bonum). But he also argues that the esse that Aquinas associates with God is not the ens commune of creatures, but is unique to God. “In this sense Being does not erect an idol before God, but saves his distance” (Marion 1991:xxiii)—in much the same way, I would argue, as my earlier suggestion regarding God as plenitude (Fülle).  

37 Note: “praise” is also a form of “discourse.” Here we glimpse the participatory and gnosiological dimensions of orthopathy and other forms of axiological epistemology (recall Solivan’s description of the imago Dei is “the seedbed for orthopathos”).  

38 Speaking of the nature of orthodoxa from a participatory perspective, RO theologian Catherine Pickstock says: “In fact the only way in which you can have non-foreclosed and yet not radically indeterminate selfhood, we hold, is in the mode of worship of the Divine. It’s only really in the act of worship that one is fully oneself, but at the same time more than oneself, because you can offer yourself to God without becoming God, and so find true identity, which is participatory and transcendent self-identity. For with the self, as with all things, everything is because it is in fact more than itself” (Kohn 1999).  

39 We might also note the “non-neutral” (Barth) heart-mind dynamic of yada/gignoskien that is the qualifier of all biblical experience and knowledge.  

40 Wesley published sixty pages of the Macarian Homilies in the first volume of A Christian Library.  


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As expressed in the Latin phrase: *lex orandi, lex credendi*; “the law of prayer is the law of belief.”

_Erfahrung_ is “experience” as an aesthetic “truth event.”


Emphases added.

In the words of Ralph Del Colle, whose 2003 presidential address to the Society for Pentecostal Studies first prompted my interest in the subject, orthopathy shows promise for formulating a new “regulative grammar for theology as a whole” (Del Colle 2004:108). Howard Ervin has noted the need for a distinctive pentecostal hermeneutic, and suggested that orthopathy could serve as its foundation (Ervin 1981:22).

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In Yong’s emphasis that “since a thing’s value is infinite, it is not representable or expressible in any theoretical language” (197) we hear echoed Gadamer, Marion, and Levinas’s insistence that phenomena are “unrepresentable” or unrecuperable “in intellectual terms.”

In light of his foundational pneumatology, Yong privileges an understanding of “imagination” as an active, creative, and affective-cognitive-conative capacity, rather than as the merely passive, reproductive, and affective organum traditionally depicted in Aristotle or Kant.

The imagination “contributes to the normative categorization of the objects of experience” in terms of (extrinsic) symbol formation, but values themselves are “intrinsic to the things we encounter.” They are ontologically “given”; reminiscent of the _es gibt_.

Emphasis added. Arguably, Yong’s pneumatic participation leans in the direction of Smith’s incarnational participation in this sense.

We have, here, a pneumatological corollary of Heidegger’s objection to onto-theology. More profoundly, we have a pentecostal affirmation of Marion’s privileging of “charity” over _Sein_.

The Spirit especially is the giver of gifts, and the giver of the faculty through which giver and gift are discerned. Acts 2:38; 11:17; Rom 5:15-18, 25; 1 Cor 13:2; 2 Cor 9:15; Eph 2:8; 1 Ti 4:14; 2 Ti 1:6; Heb 6:4.

Smith speaks of pursuing metaphysics in a way that it “grows . . . directly out of prayer and public action” (Smith 2003a:238).

Stating my case negatively, Sokolowski also notes that “technical reason,” established itself as reason in modernity via its reductive methodologies, thus coming to “rule over” experience and the power to know. This came to be the situation for theology as well, via the imposition of overly scholastic and rationalistic forms of theology that “rule over . . . experience” (Sokolowski 2000:200-202). But if God meets us in experience, such methodologies also “rule over” the power to know God experientially. As such, they act as _anti-epistemologies_ that are, in the end, _atheological_. They are, functionally, forms of cessationism waiting to be recognized as such, and rejected.

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